F-35      US Air Force / Ministerie van Defensie, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons      
Military Technology / Russia


threatening system


NATO F-35s and fighter jets could lose their stealth advantage with new Russian bistatic radar


 By: Gabriela Ramos 
 On: 6/23/2021 

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F-35
US Air Force / Ministerie van Defensie, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons

In a possible future conflict, Russian Struna-1 radar promises to significantly threaten NATO stealth aircraft. It is speculated that the system will be introduced in Moscow.

The Struna-1 bistatic radar, developed by NNIIRT (a division of Almaz-Antey), is one of the most innovative systems, among the many already advertised as “stealth kill”. The Struna-1 was originally developed in 1999, and an advanced version called Barrier-E was introduced for export at MAKS 2007, and again at MAKS 2017, although it is not in the Almaz-Antey online catalogue.

The name “bistatic” is due to the fact that the radar receiver and transmitter are positioned in different places, unlike conventional radars, which locate the receiver and transmitter at the same point. In conventional radars there is, therefore, a limitation due to the fourth inverse power law.

As the radar target moves away from the transmission source, the radar signal decreases. The detection of a radar works by receiving signal reflections and, in a conventional radar, the signal is received four times weaker than the one sent. Thus, stealth works because, at a distance, the aircraft can reduce its radar returns by scattering and absorbing them with radiation-absorbing materials. Thus, the radar cannot track or distinguish information about these aircraft.

With the distance between the transmitter and receiver on the Struna-1, this problem is solved. In this way, the radar becomes more sensitive. Russian sources claim that this setup increases the cross section radar (RCS) of a target by almost three times and the anti-radar materials, which serve to spread radio waves, lose their effectiveness. Thus, not only stealth aircraft will be detected, but also other objects with low RCS, such as cruise missiles and hang gliders.

Despite the variations, the maximum distance interval between two individual towers is 50 km, which leads to a maximum perimeter of 500 km. The energy consumption of individual towers is relatively low and they are less vulnerable to anti-radiation weapons as they do not emit as much energy as conventional radar.

In addition, the towers are mobile, which allows an advantage in conflicts, and can be deployed in different locations. The towers communicate with each other via microwave data and have a centralized monitoring station, which can be positioned at significant distances. Also by operating in different locations, the system is able to continue operating in case a node falls, even with less precision.

The system is also capable of detecting targets at low altitudes, as the height of the towers is only 25 meters. This is another advantage of the Struna-1, as conventional radars also have difficulty revealing targets at low altitudes. However, the resulting disadvantage is that the maximum detection altitude is also low. The maximum detection is 7 km at the highest point, and the range decreases as the towers approach. Another disadvantage is the transverse dimension of the detection zone, which also ends up being limited, ranging from 1.5 km near the towers to 12 km at the optimum point between the towers.

Because of these disadvantages, Struna-1 will not replace traditional radar as a general search engine. It will also not function as a crosshair radar and will not be able to guide surface-to-air missiles, because of its inability to provide constant radar illumination by tracking a target. But still, because it can detect stealth aircraft, it will be a good trade-off for other longer-band radar systems.

As such, the Struna-1 will not represent the ultimate end of stealth technology, but it could pose a significant threat to NATO stealth aircraft in a possible conflict in the future. Stealth aircraft destined for attack may be vulnerable as they need to profile flights that end up taking them to areas where the Struna-1 can detect them. In addition, there are other stealth detection systems that, acting in conjunction with the Struna-1, could be decisive in providing information about the position and movement of stealth aircraft.
Gabriela Ramos
Gabriela is the latest addition to the editorial team of our website, having provided us with her solid background in editing, publishing and photography, and her interest and training in aviation history and historiography. His good taste and common sense and great cleverness and sagacity in the selection of themes and materials greatly enriched our vocabulary and narrative style. Gabriela brought unusual predicates and came to stay, helping to point the way of success of our portal.

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